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Lives	v	livelihoods,	part	1:	how	can	we	measure	the
value	of	a	life?
Policies	that	suppress	or	control	the	COVID-19	pandemic	prevent	illness	and	save	lives,	but	exact	an	economic	toll.
How	should	we	balance	lives	and	livelihoods	to	determine	which	policy	is	best?	In	the	first	of	two	posts,	Matthew
Adler	(Duke	University/LSE),	Richard	Bradley	(LSE),	Maddalena	Ferranna	(Princeton),	Marc	Fleurbaey
(Princeton	and	Paris	School	of	Economics),	James	Hammitt	(Harvard)	and	Alex	Voorhoeve	(LSE)	compare
the	benefit-cost	and	social	welfare	approaches	to	doing	so.
What	is	benefit-cost	analysis?
Benefit-cost	analysis	evaluates	a	policy	in	terms	of	the	sum	of	the	monetary	equivalents	of	its	outcome.	The	most
widely	used	monetary	measure	of	the	value	of	saving	lives	is	the	Value	of	a	Statistical	Life	(VSL).	This	is	derived
from	the	rate	at	which	people	are	willing	to	trade	off	small	changes	in	their	income	against	small	changes	in	their
risk	of	death.	For	example,	suppose	someone	would	accept	a	pay	cut	of	$10,000	per	year,	but	no	more,	to	reduce
their	annual	risk	of	mortality	by	0.1%.	Then	the	monetary	value	of	their	statistical	life	is	$10,000/0.001	=
$10,000,000.	(What	this	means	is	that,	if	we	had	a	population	of	1,000	such	people,	then,	in	the	aggregate,	they
would	be	willing	to	pay	their	fair	share	of	$10,000,000	to	reduce	their	individual	risks	of	death	by	0.1%,	thereby
lowering	the	expected	number	of	deaths	in	their	population	by	1.)
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The	value	of	a	statistical	life	derived	from	an	individual’s	preferences	will	depend	on	their	income	and	wealth,	which
can	have	unacceptable	consequences	for	benefit-cost	analysis.	In	particular,	the	fact	that	someone	who	is	well-off
is	likely	to	place	a	higher	monetary	value	on	risk	reduction	than	someone	who	is	less	well-off	implies	that	the
interests	of	the	well-off	will	count	for	more.	By	using	a	single	value	of	a	statistical	life,	such	as	the	population
average,	this	problem	is	avoided.
A	new	one	arises,	however,	because	such	an	average	assigns	the	same	value	to	every	person’s	life	saved,
independently	of	their	age.	But	death	is	generally	a	more	serious	loss	when	it	occurs	earlier	in	life.	Reasoning	in
terms	of	life	years	preserved	rather	than	lives	saved	is	therefore	more	sensible.	This	can	be	done	by	using	the
Value	of	a	Statistical	Life	Year	(VSLY)	measure.	This	is	obtained	by	dividing	the	average	value	of	a	statistical	life	of
the	population	by	the	average	life	expectancy	remaining.	The	value	of	saving	the	life	of	someone	in	any	particular
age	cohort	is	then	given	by	the	product	of	the	value	of	a	statistical	life	year	and	the	life	expectancy	remaining	for	the
cohort.
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Naturally,	estimates	of	the	value	of	statistical	lives	and	life	years	will	depend	on	a	country’s	income	per	capita.	But
they	also	vary	considerably	between	different	agents,	even	for	a	single	country.	For	example,	in	the	USA,	the	typical
value	of	a	statistical	life	used	by	government	agencies	is	around	$10,000,000,	and	for	a	life	year	a	little	over
$300,000.	However,	the	World	Health	Organization	has	suggested	that	interventions	that	generate	a	year	in	full
health	for	more	than	3	times	per	capita	income	are	likely	not	worth	the	cost.	In	line	with	this	formula,	for	the	USA,
the	Institute	for	Clinical	and	Economic	Review	suggests	values	between	$100,000	and	$150,000	for	one	healthy	life
year,	which	is	between	a	third	and	half	of	the	just-mentioned	estimates	for	the	value	of	a	statistical	life	year.	Similar
variations	exist	in	other	countries’	assessments.	As	we	show	below,	the	ranking	of	policies	to	deal	with	the
pandemic	based	on	benefit-cost	analysis	may	well	depend	on	which	values	are	adopted.	So	it	is	critical	to	pay
attention	to	the	justification	of	any	particular	choice.
The	two	measures	adopted	in	benefit-cost	analysis	face	the	same	dilemma.	If	one	uses	individual-specific	values,
then	the	lives	and	(quality-adjusted)	life-years	of	the	well-off	are	judged	to	be	more	valuable	than	those	of	the
poorest.	But	if,	in	order	to	avoid	this	inequity,	one	uses	population	averages,	then	the	impact	of	policies	on	non-
average	individuals	will	be	assessed	in	a	way	that	need	not	correspond	to	their	interests.
For	example,	a	policy	which	imposed	a	loss	in	income	just	shy	of	$10,000	on	a	poor	person	in	order	to	reduce	their
chance	of	death	from	COVID-19	by	0.1%	would	appear	to	produce	a	net	expected	benefit	to	this	person	if	we	used
a	population-average	value	of	a	statistical	life	of	$10,000,000.	But	this	person	might	reasonably	judge	that,	for	them,
the	risk	reduction	is	not	worth	the	income	lost.
Social	welfare	analysis
Social	welfare	analysis	avoids	both	the	inequity	of	putting	an	individual-specific	monetary	valuation	on	life	and	the
inefficiency	of	population-average	valuations,	by	focusing	directly	on	each	individual’s	wellbeing,	assessed	in	terms
of	their	health	and	wealth.	Since	the	wellbeing	of	everyone,	rich	or	poor,	counts	equally,	there	is	no	bias	towards
the	rich.	And	since	health	and	wealth	are	combined,	ideally	in	a	way	that	suits	each	individual,	only	policies	that
promote	each	person’s	wellbeing	will	be	favoured,	which	solves	the	inefficiency	problem.
Policies	have	different	impacts	on	wellbeing:	a	policy	may	protect	the	old	and	vulnerable,	for	example,	but	impose
substantial	losses	on	the	young	poor	who	are	at	risk	of	unemployment.	We	therefore	need	a	measure	of	social
wellbeing,	called	a	social	welfare	function,	to	weigh	these	different	impacts.	A	commonly	used	social	welfare
function	is	the	utilitarian	one,	which	assigns	to	each	set	of	individual	wellbeing	values	the	average	of	the	values.
This	way	of	aggregating	individuals’	wellbeing	is	indifferent	to	whether	a	given	increment	in	wellbeing	accrues	to	a
well-off	or	badly-off	person.	But	it	is	commonly	argued	that	it	is	more	important	to	increase	the	wellbeing	of	the
worse-off,	because	the	improvement	comes	to	those	who	are	in	greatest	need	or	because	such	improvements
reduce	inequality.	This	problem	can	be	addressed	by	using	social	welfare	functions	that	give	extra	weight	to
improvements	in	the	wellbeing	of	the	worse-off.
The	choice	of	social	welfare	function	is	fundamentally	an	ethical	one.	An	important	advantage	of	social	welfare
analysis	is	that	it	allows	for	this	choice	to	be	made	explicitly	and	transparently.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	authors	and	not	those	of	the	COVID-19	blog,	nor	LSE.	It	draws	on	a	policy
brief	for	the	G20	policy	and	advice	network,	Think20,	and	is	the	first	of	two	posts	looking	at	how	to	measure	the
impact	of	COVID-19	containment	policies:	the	second	is	here.
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